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Abstract: This article explores the significance of the work of Stuart Hall for social 
and political anthropology. It identifies the concern with concrete conjunctural 
analysis, the continuing attention to the problem of hegemony, and the centrality of a 
politics of articulation in theory and practice as core features of Hall’s work. The 
article also touches on his complex relationship with theory and theorising while 
grounding his work in a series of political and ethical commitments within and 
beyond the university. 
 




The death of Stuart Hall in February 2014 attracted considerable attention, and this 
contribution to Focaal reflects on the significance of his work for anthropology, and 
for social and political anthropology in particular.i This feels like a rather strange 
undertaking, given my own sense of the evident affinities between Hall’s project in 
cultural studies and the work of critical anthropologists. However, I think Hall seems 
relatively, albeit unevenly, neglected despite these affinities , with perhaps two 
reasons for this. First, cultural studies emerged at an odd moment in anthropology – 
when much critical anthropological work identified itself by refusing the ‘culture’ 
concept. The move away from culture emphasised its depoliticising and softening 
effects, through the dominant organicist, stable and consensual conceptions of culture 
(see the illuminating discussion of culture, Gramsci and anthropology in Crehan, 
2002). Cultural studies, by contrast, took culture – and popular culture in particular – 
as a site of political struggle: the domain through which forms of domination and 
subordination, inclusion and marginalisation, and hierarchical relations could be 
organised and ordered. 
 
Perhaps the other reason Hall’s work is less visible than it might be reflects the 
absence of the Great Book. This seems to condemn him to exclusion from the 
pantheon of ‘great thinkers’ in the social sciences whose work provides a touchstone 
for many working in anthropology (Harvey, Giddens, Bauman, etc). On his death, 
Tariq Ali posed the question: ‘Unlike almost everyone else of his 1956 and later 
cohort, he did not write a book. Why, many asked, did he concentrate on the essay?’ 
(Tariq Ali: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/10/stuart-hall-
radical-thinker-thatcherism). Leaving aside the odd fetishization of the sole authored 
book, there are many reasons that might explain Hall’s way of working. Let me offer 
two that certainly contributed to his absence from the list of wizards of Grand Theory 
(or the providers of Epochal definitions of the present era). Despite being theoretically 
sophisticated and able to mobilize diverse conceptual resources from across many 
disciplines (including anthropology), he had little interest in delivering grand 
theoretical statements. Famously, he once argued that ‘theory is always a detour’ on 
the road to ‘somewhere more important (1991: 42). This somewhere more important – 
the sorts of knowledge that mattered – was always about how to understand concrete 
political situations (elsewhere – 1992: 286 – he emphasizes that this detour through 
theory is a ‘necessary detour’). As a result, Hall – and cultural studies in his wake – 
has tended to be theoretically open, borrowing and bending analytical resources from 
a variety of places in order to find ways of illuminating these concrete political 
situations. This has led to charges of inconsistency, fashion following, trendiness, etc., 
for cultural studies. These may well be true – but they miss Hall’s persistent 
commitment to ‘theorising’ as an analytic practice rather than doing Theory (in which 
purity, consistency and grandeur are often more highly valued). Later, I will return to 
the questions – the orientation – that disciplined this theoretical openness, and meant 
that theorising through ‘borrowing and bending’ was conditioned by a consistent set 
of purposes. 
 
The second reason that contributes to the absence of the Book of Hall relates to his 
commitment to working and thinking collectively. As many histories of the Centre for 
Cultural Studies have shown, Hall fostered an approach to collaborative working that 
remains rare amidst the fetishised individualism of academic work. As a result, Hall 
left us many collaborative projects, many reflective and exploratory essays, many 
urgent interventions into political and academic moments, and possibly the most 
neglected Big Book of all – Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and 
Order (written with Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, 
published in 1978, whose second edition appeared in 2013). This collaborative work 
offered a careful conjunctural analysis of Britain in the 1970s; its argument that 
Britain was experiencing a shift towards an authoritarian populism foreshadowed the 
emergence of ‘Thatcherism’; it was the first cultural studies book to engage with the 
ways in which the British social formation and its crises were thoroughly racialized, 
and its method (of analysis and writing) offers an exemplary model of how critical 
intellectual work in cultural studies might be conducted. What surprises me is that the 
book seems to fail to fit into many histories of cultural studies (it is not a direct 
product of one of the Birmingham Centre’s subgroups nor does it embody one of the 
supposed fields of investigation: media, literature, education, sub-cultures, etc).  
 
Despite the regularity with which studies pick it up as a reference point for work on 
authoritarianism, neo-liberalism and the punitive turn (e.g., Makovicky, 2013), 
Policing the Crisis not only goes missing from some accounts of cultural studies, it is 
also strangely absent from related academic places where one might expect to find it. 
It is largely missing from UK criminology, despite dealing with crime and policing 
(in a specific and wider sense), and from media studies (despite some original work 
on primary and secondary definers and on the popular/vernacular voice in the press). 
Perhaps I should not be surprised: after all, these are largely conventionalized fields 
of study. But then it also goes missing from what one might expect to be more 
‘friendly’ places: for example, Bob Jessop’s recent work on ‘cultural political 
economy’ eschews any mention of the book (or of cultural studies more generally) 
while Loïc Wacquant’s examination of the penal turn associated with neoliberalism 
also does not know the book exists, despite an apparently shared interest in 
authoritarianism and Law and Order (Wacquant, 2009: for some of the debates around 
Wacquant, see Kalb, 2012; Lacey, 2010). 
 
So, the uneven visibility of Hall’s work in anthropology is hardly unique, but it means 
the neglect of a body of work with strong affinities around both crucial issues (such as 
power, racialised formations, hegemony and what Gramsci called the field of the 
‘national-popular’) and a sustained orientation to thinking better about the problem of 
the present. Incidentally, Focaal has consistently been one of the places where his 
work has been picked up and these connections noticed and explored. It is this 
concern with the current, the concrete, and the conjunctural that disciplines the 
‘detour through theory’ in his work. Talking at a US conference in the 1980s, he 
highlighted the political struggles over AIDS, arguing that this was what concrete 
issues demanded of intellectual work:  
 
I've used that example, not because it's a perfect example, but because it's a 
specific example, because it has a concrete meaning, because it challenges us in 
its complexity, and in so doing has things to teach us about the future of serious 
theoretical work. It preserves the essential nature of intellectual work and 
critical reflection, the irreducibility of the insights which theory can bring to 
political practice, insights which cannot be arrived at in any other way. And at 
the same time, it rivets us to the necessary modesty of theory… (1992: 286) 
 
This view of the ‘necessary modesty of theory’ did not imply a simple empiricism. On 
the contrary, his recurrent touchstone for addressing the specific/concrete example 
was Marx’s observation in the Grundrisse that the ‘concrete is the result of many 
determinations’. As a result, analyzing the concrete demanded supple theorizing, 
rather than a theory that announced in advance what was true, right or correct (and 
thus treated the concrete example only as an illustration of what is already known). 
Hall’s theorizing was continuously engaged with a dialogue about the limitations of a 
Marxist political economy which lacked that ‘necessary modesty’ in the face of the 
concrete, preferring instead to return to the security of solidified (if not ossified) 
theoretical categories.ii Instead, Hall argued for a practice of theorizing about the 
concrete that would always be ‘without guarantees’ (1996; see the collection by 




As someone forged in the making of the British New Left in the 1960s, Hall sought to 
shape an intellectual project that had political questions at its centre – that the study of 
the present was necessarily intersected by politics in different aspects. Most 
obviously, politics was at stake in understanding the character of the present moment 
– the forces, tendencies, forms of power, relations of domination and subordination 
that were condensed in a conjuncture. Equally, the work of doing conjunctural 
analysis was political in the sense that it was designed to reveal the possibilities and 
resources for progressive action – easier said than done, it is true, but Hall never lost 
sight of that obligation of intellectual work. 
 
 
This orientation to the particularity of the conjuncture – and attention to its 
complexity – is characteristic of Hall’s work. The concept of conjuncture highlights 
the ways in which moments of transformation, break and the possibility of new 
‘settlements’ come into being. Conjunctures have no necessary duration (they are 
neither short nor long), rather their time is determined by the capacity of political 
forces – the leading bloc – to shape new alignments, to overcome (or at least stabilize) 
existing antagonisms and contradictions. This is (again) not a Theory, but an 
orientation – a way of focusing analytical attention on the multiplicity of forces, 
accumulated antagonisms, and possible lines of emergence from the conjuncture 
(rather than assuming a singular crisis and one line of development). It was, for Hall, 
an insistence of the complexity of such a moment, such that the nature of the crisis 
could not be reduced to a single cause, force or even primary contradiction. 
Characteristically quoting Gramsci, Hall recently insisted that: 
 
Gramsci argued that, though the economic must never be forgotten, conjunctural 
crises are never solely economic, or economically-determined ‘in the last 
instance’. They arise when a number of contradictions at work in different key 
practices and sites come together - or ‘conjoin’ - in the same moment and political 
space and, as Althusser said, ‘fuse in a ruptural unity’. Analysis here focuses on 
crises and breaks, and the distinctive character of the ‘historic settlements’ which 
follow. The condensation of forces during a period of crisis, and the new social 
configurations which result, mark a new ‘conjuncture’. (2011: 9) 
 
This does mean an understanding of social forces in their richest sense, rather than an 
assumption that they are simply the transposition of class relations to the fields of 
politics, ideology and party. Policing the Crisis embodied this orientation, exploring a 
conjuncture in which the forms of social and political consent that had sustained a 
post-war ‘settlement’ (or series of intertwined economic, social, political and cultural 
settlements) had dissolved from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, creating the 
conditions for new alignments of political forces and the promise of new settlements – 
to be incarnated in the authoritarian populist political practices of Thatcherism. Two 
different analytical movements are at stake here. The first concerns debates with – 
and within – Marxism about class relations as social forces. Following the work of 
E.P. Thompson (193) and others, Hall shared an interest in the ‘making’ of classes as 
social forms and political projects (see also Carrier and Kalb, 2015). But a second 
analytical and political move insisted that classes were never the only social forces or 
political projects: for example, gendered and racialized formations of inequality, 
oppression and struggle were also at stake in how people lived their subordinations – 
and contested them. This second move strained some of the otherwise proiductive 
relationships between Marxism and cultural studies. 
 
Hall’s relationship to Gramsci was persistent and profound. Yet it was always held in 
a state of dynamic tension, entangled with the concerete problems to be analysed and 
other conceptual resources for thinking about those issues. Hall himself tried to clarify 
this relationship:  
 
I do not claim that, in any simple way, Gramsci 'has the answers' or 'holds the 
key' to our present troubles. I do believe that we must 'think' our problems in a 
Gramscian way - which is different. We mustn't use Gramsci (as we have for 
so long abused Marx) like an Old Testament prophet who, at the correct 
moment, will offer us the consoling and appropriate quotation. We can't pluck 
up this 'Sardinian' from his specific and unique political formation, beam him 
down at the end of the 20th century, and ask him to solve our problems for us: 
especially since the whole thrust of his thinking was to refuse this easy 
transfer of generalisations from one conjuncture, nation or epoch to another. 
(1986: 16) 
 
I will return to the relationship between conjunctural analysis and other aspects of his 
work in a moment, but there are other important ways in which Hall’s work was 
political. These concerned the relationship between intellectual work and the 
university as an institutionalized field of relationships and practices devoted to the 
organization and disciplining of knowledge production and distribution. Hall’s vision 
of cultural studies was as a project that would work beyond disciplinary boundaries, 
devoted to a view that the social world did not divide neatly into the categories of 
social, economic, political – each of which ‘belonged’ to a discipline. This was 
something more than multi- or inter-disciplinarity – but involved a sense of working 
simultaneously between and beyond existing disciplines. This transdisciplinary (or as 
I have argued elsewhere, ‘undisciplined’) approach encountered its own 
contradictions when cultural studies became institutionalized as a field of study (or 
even discipline) with its own borders, canons, and claims. Nevertheless, the original 
move was liberatory, but it demanded two other acts of intellectual politics: a 
thorough knowledge of what the disciplines had to say about a particular field, topic 
or issue and a willingness to find allies across institutional borders. Such challenges to 
disciplinary proprietorial authority were not, of course, well received and cultural 
studies has spent a lot of its life involved in such ‘turf wars’. 
 
Secondly, Hall was, as I have indicated, committed to working collectively and 
collaboratively – in both intellectual and organizational ways. During his time at the 
Birmingham Centre, postgraduate students developed their work in cooperative 
subgroups, shared the administration of the Centre and even joined the selection 
panels for the following year’s students. This ethos ran deep – shaping much of the 
intellectual production of Birmingham, including Policing the Crisis, and was one of 
the elements at stake in Hall’s move to a position as Professor of Social Policy at the  
UK’s Open University in 1978, where much of the teaching was developed through 
the ‘collective teacher’ of the course team which planned and prepared teaching 
material for study at a distance. It is difficult to emphasise enough what a break this 
represented (and indeed still represents) with the individualized and privatized modes 
of intellectual work in the academy. It marks yet another way in which Hall’s policy 
and practice differs from the conventional Great Man model of the public and private 
intellectual (on the left as much as elsewhere). 
 
The question of Hegemony 
 
Hall is most famously (perhaps notoriously?) associated with the concept of 
hegemony. This term, borrowed from Gramsci, has been both enormously productive 
and the subject of continuing controversy. For Hall (and others), hegemony marked 
the critical issue for thinking about social, political and cultural domination in ways 
which did not assume that what Gramsci called ‘the leading function in the economic 
sphere’ was not simply reproduced in stabilized relations of domination and 
subordination. To put it another way, ruling classes did not simply rule: their power in 
one domain had to be translated into political, social and cultural authority or 
leadership. This attention to hegemony is a means of countering both forms of 
economic reductionism (or the elisions of politics and economy in political economy) 
and the functionalism characteristic of conceptions of ideological domination that do 
not move further than Marx and Engels’ claim (in The German Ideology) that ‘the 
ruling ideas of the age are the ideas of the ruling class’. Rather hegemony posed the 
question of rule differently in two ways. 
 
First, it asks how the consent of subordinated groups is gained and maintained by 
ruling groups. ‘Consent’ in this sense denotes a condition of social leadership by a 
ruling bloc. It is understood by Gramsci as something which is both hard work and 
contingent as relations of power between social groups shift. Hegemony is not a 
stable condition but requires political-cultural work to bring into existence and 
maintain. Second, the route through Gramsci creates the condition for a different 
understanding of social forces (and their political representation) from an orthodox 
Marxist account. This may be a critical moment of translation in the relationship 
between cultural studies and political economic analyses. Gramsci’s writings in The 
Prison Notebooks (the core texts available in English during the emergence of cultural 
studies) are famously cryptic and elusively expressed, such that he constantly writes 
about social groups rather than economic classes. Cultural studies has worked on this 
ambiguity to understand the ways in which ‘social forces’ may be more than 
economic classes: other forms of collective actor may be politically significant, while 
classes do not necessarily understand or represent themselves as ‘classes’. This 
reflects the critique of the ‘overpoliticized’ view of ideology developed by Nicos 
Poulantzas. Poulantzas argued against treating ideologies ‘as if they were political 
number plates worn by social classes on their backs’ (1973: 202). He went on to argue 
that  
 
in reality, the dominant ideology does not simply reflect the conditions of 
existence of the dominant class, the ‘pure and simple’ subject, but rather the 
concrete political relation between the dominant and dominated classes in a social 
formation. It is often permeated by elements stemming from the ‘way of life’ of 
classes or fractions other than the dominant class or fraction (1973: 203) 
 This view of ideology opened up questions that Hall addressed through concepts of 
hegemony and articulation. How did subordinate groups come to be ‘taken account 
of’, or become ‘spoken for’ in hegemonic formations? At the same time, how did 
different forms of social domination and subordination come to be condensed 
together? If classes were not the only social forces, what others were in play – and 
how did they come to be politically effective (or ineffective?). Here – for Hall – were 
critically important but troubling issues about how forms of gendered and racialized 
domination were articulated with (but never reducible to) class relations. They were 
issues that he explored through a series of terms – which circle around the question of 
hegemony: the popular, commonsense, identities and the idea of articulation.  I will 
take up articulation in the following section, but before that will briefly consider the 
many controversies in which Hall’s work on hegemony has been enmeshed. Hall’s 
work on Thatcherism, which developed the idea of authoritarian populism from 
Policing the Crisis, was criticized by Kevin Bonnett and his colleagues (1984) for 
paying insufficient attention to the non-ideological relations of force in the crisis of 
British capitalism (see also the later discussion by Leys, 1990). More generally, Hall 
and his collaborators have regularly been challenged for under-valuing the political 
economic (e.g., see the intriguing discussion after Hall’s death by Alex Callincos, 
2014). Hegemony – and Hall’s development of the idea – has also been more recently 
challenged by theorists of ‘posthegemony’ or ‘post-hegemonic’ politics for 
misunderstanding the contemporary political scene, transformed, as they see it, by the 
emergence of the ‘multitude’ as the central vector of alignment (see, for example, 
Beasley-Murray, 2010). 
 
My aim is not to resolve the various arguments in which hegemony has become 
enmeshed but to indicate its continuing salience as a way of posing questions of 
political rule and social leadership. It is, however, important to stress that Hall always 
insisted on its contingency and fragility. It could never be imagined as a stable 
condition of class rule, rather it needed to be understood as one possible moment of 
the ‘series of unstable equilibria’ that Gramsci describes as characterizing the life of 
the state. Here we can see a typical entanglement of Hall’s analytical orientation 
towards the particular and conjunctural and a political attention to the making and 
unmaking of hegemonic moments. Policing the Crisis explored the disintegration of a 
hegemonic moment – brought about by the proliferation of ideological, cultural and 
political challenges to the forms through which a particular hegemonic form had been 
articulated. The argument located both the particularity of such challenges and the 
ways in which they were entwined with multiple crises. The moment of crisis was, in 
fact, a conjunctural condensation of different crises: 
 
First it is a crisis of and for British capitalism. . . Second, then, it is a crisis of the 
relations of social forces engendered by this deep rupture at the economic level—
a crisis in the political class struggle and in the political apparatuses . . . at the 
point where the political struggle issues into the theatre of politics, it has been 
experienced as a crisis of Party . . . It has been of profound importance that the 
major strategies for dealing with the crisis and its political effects have been 
drawn in large measure from the social democratic repertoire, not from that of the 
traditional party of the ruling class. The dislocations which this has produced in 
the development of the crisis, as well as resistances to it and thus to the possible 
forms of its dissolution, have hardly begun to be calculated…Third, it has been a 
crisis of the State. The entry into late capitalism demands a thorough 
reconstruction of the capitalist state, an enlargement of its sphere, its apparatuses, 
its relation to civil society. . . Fourth it is a crisis in political legitimacy, in social 
authority, in hegemony and in the forms of class struggle. This crucially touches 
on questions of consent and coercion.  (Hall et al., 1978, p. 317-319) 
 
 
Articulation and the work of politics 
 
The concern with hegemony led Hall to a particular view of the relationships between 
politics, culture and power. Culture was the domain in which people lived – and 
imagined or understood – their relationship to their subordination. Culture comprised 
the imaginative, affective and interpretive maps of the social world and its 
organisation. Through cultural forms and practices, people came to see themselves 
and others as enmeshed in particular types of condition, relationship and possible 
lines of movement. The enormous depth, diversity and productivity of the field of 
culture means that it is continuously traversed by political forces, seeking to forge the 
connections that would tie political projects into the everyday or common sense forms 
of popular thinking. Culture never exists in a ‘pure’ state, outside of these relations – 
the entanglement is both permanent and constantly shifting as each element changes 
and/or changes place. For Hall, this was where cultural studies intersected most 
evidently with Gramsci’s concern with the relationship between hegemony and 
commonsense. For Gramsci, we are always ‘the product of the historical process to 
date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces without leaving an inventory… 
Moreover, commonsense is a collective noun, like religion: there is not just one 
common sense, for that too is a product of history and a part of the historical process’ 
(1973: 324-5: see also Hall and O’Shea, 2013). This insistence on the fragmentary 
and heterogeneous formation of commonsense is important because it points to the 
work of political articulation that is required to ‘hegemonise’ selected elements or 
fragments of commonsense to create the appearance of a shared, unitary and coherent 
conception of the world. This is the articulatory work of hegemony building – it 
attempts to draw on selected elements of common sense (the Right’s efforts to 
commandeer discourses of nation, work and family, for example) and sew them into 
an apparently natural and necessary attachment to the specific political project. 
Writing in the 1980s, Hall argued for recognising Gramsci’s importance for engaging 
with politics as an articulatory practice: 
 
Since, in fact, the political character of our ideas cannot be guaranteed by our 
class position or by the 'mode of production', it is possible for the Right to 
construct a politics which does speak to people's experience, which does insert 
itself into what Gramsci called the necessarily fragmentary, contradictory 
nature of common sense, which does resonate with some of their ordinary 
aspirations, and which, in certain circumstances, can recoup them as 
subordinate subjects, into a historical project which 'hegemonises' what we 
used - erroneously – to think of as their 'necessary class interests'. Gramsci is 
one of the first modern Marxists to recognise that interests are not given but 
have to be politically and ideologically constructed. (1987: 20) 
 
Articulation was always used by Hall in a double sense – referring, on the one hand, 
to expressing or giving voice while, on the other, meaning to make connections (like 
the cab and trailer of an articulated lorry…). Although cultural studies (and the critics 
of cultural studies) have tended to focus attention on the first of these – the 
ideological, discursive, symbolic practices of articulation – Hall never forgot that 
hegemony was also the site of the second type of articulatory work. This required the 
assembling of a (would be) hegemonic bloc that involved compromises, alliance 
building and the creation of a (temporary) set of mutual alignments and interests. It 
also required the work of engaging subaltern social groups into this project: taking 
account of them, bringing them to recognize or endorse the need for ‘leadership’ in 
the direction prescribed. The moment of ‘consent’ is never just ideational or cultural – 
but nor can it exist without that dimension. As another significant figure in the 
emergence of cultural studies once argued:  
 
A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a 
structure. It is a realised complex of experiences, relationships and activities, with 
specific and changing pressures and limits. In practice, that is, hegemony can 
never be singular. Its internal structures are highly complex, as can readily be seen 
in any concrete analysis. Moreover (and this is crucial, reminding us of the 
necessary thrust of the concept), it does not just passively exist as a form of 
dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It 
is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its 
own. (Williams, 1977: 112) 
 
This understanding of the critical but always contingent relationship between 
hegemony and the popular remained an organizing thread through Hall’s work until 
his death. It was an analytical orientation that connected his work on conjunctural 
formations with the exploration of identities and identifications (see, for example, his 
remarkable 1986 essay on Gramsci and the study of race and ethnicity). Equally, it 
was a political orientation that linked his analyses of Thatcherism to reflections on the 
failure of the left to mount a coherent opposition and alternative to the combined and 
transformative forces of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism in the UK and beyond 
(see for example, Hall, 1988). In one of his final essays (written with Alan O’Shea), 
they argued that the Labour party’s concession of the terrain of ‘commonsense’ to the 
contradictory nostrums of neo-liberalism left the possibility of a more progressive 
common sense unexamined:  
 
Labour can only win the battle of ideas if it takes its role as a ‘popular 
educator’ seriously. Each crisis provides an opportunity to shift the direction 
of popular thinking, instead of simply mirroring the right’s populist touch or 
pursuing short-term opportunism. The left, and Labour in particular, must 
adopt a more courageous, innovative, ‘educative’ and path-breaking strategic 
approach if they are to gain ground. (Hall and O’Shea, 2013: 25) 
 
Important as it is, this is not the place where I want to end.  None of what I have 
written so far provides the necessary sense of Stuart Hall’s embodied practice of 
articulation – his consistent commitment to a political pedagogy that sought to engage 
people in transformative dialogue. His writings perform this sort of style: they are 
exploratory, inviting the reader to consider and, possibly, to think again. His work 
with the Open University – in writing and in TV programs/videos – reveals an effort 
to find a popular pedagogy appropriate to the university’s mission to be ‘open’ (and 
not merely accessible). Beyond this, the sense of loss that was widely articulated on 
his death spoke of encounters with a person who thought and acted dialogically (in a 
Bakhtinian sense). This embodied engagement combined listening and speaking as a 
pedagogic, political and ethical practice. As David Scott has argued, Stuart ‘cultivated 
an ethical voice responsive to the violations that grow out of complacent satisfactions, 
secure doctrines, congealed orders, sedimented identities’ (2005: 1). In the same 
article, Scott also talks of Stuart ‘practicing generosity’, marking a combination of an 
ethics and an embodied practice that remains strikingly rare in both academic and 
political settings. Yet any commitment to articulation (and re-articulation) can only 
flourish if the engagement is mutual, rather than one-sided.iii I was one of the many 
beneficiaries of that generosity and would hope that readers here will recognize and 
borrow that disposition to practice rather than any specific concept or theoretical 
orientation. 
 
Author: John Clarke is an Emeritus Professor of Social Policy at the Open University 
in the UK. A former post-graduate student at the Birmingham Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, he has worked on the intersections between cultural 
studies and the analysis of welfare states. His recent publications include Publics, 
Politics and Power (with Janet Newman, Sage 2009), Disputing Citizenship (with 
Kathleen Coll, Evelina Dagnino and Catherine Neveu, The Policy Press, 2014) and 
the forthcoming Making Policy Move: Towards a Politics of Translation and 
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